The Limits of Realism read book DJV, MOBI, PDF
9780198744122 English 0198744129 Tim Button explores the relationship between words and world; between semantics and scepticism. A certain kind of philosopher--the external realist--worries that appearances might be radically deceptive; we might all, for example, be brains in vats, stimulated by an infernal machine. But anyone who entertains the possibility of radical deception must also entertain a further worry: that all of our thoughts are totally contentless. That worry is just incoherent. We cannot, then, be external realists, who worry about the possibility of radical deception. Equally, though, we cannot be internal realists, who reject all possibility of deception. We must position ourselves somewhere between internal realism and external realism, but we cannot hope to say exactly where. We must be realists, for what that is worth, and realists within limits. In establishing these claims, Button critically explores and develops several themes from Hilary Putnam's work: the model-theoretic arguments; the connection between truth and justification; the brain-in-vat argument; semantic externalism; and conceptual relativity. The Limits of Realism establishes the continued significance of these topics for all philosophers interested in mind, logic, language, or the possibility of metaphysics., Tim Button presents a bold new account of the relationship between minds, words, and world. The contours of the realism debate can be traced by considering the legacy of scepticism. A certain kind of realist--an external realist--invokes the picture of a 'God's Eye point of view'. All truths are revealed to God. But the external realist is painfully aware that we are not gods. Indeed, she might worry that we might all just be brains in vats being fed electronic signals by some infernal machine, so that we are victims of some radical deception. Such worries are bad, to be sure, but they get worse. For Hilary Putnam has given us tools--the model-theoretic arguments--that convert the worry that appearances are radically deceptive into the worry that none of our thoughts is so much as capable of being true or false. That last worry is just incoherent. Button argues that we must smash the picture of a 'God's Eye point of view' and overcome the worry that appearances are radically deceptive. This is no easy task, but Putnam's anti-sceptical brain-in-vat argument points to a general and resilient way to overcome the fear of radical deception. Unfortunately, the argument has its limits. We cannot be internal realists, who reject any possibility of deception, for our ability to insulate ourselves against radical deception is as vague as the word "radical" itself. We must position ourselves somewhere between internal realism and external realism, and we cannot hope to say exactly where. We are forced to philosophise in the absence of any comforting picture. We are realists, for what that is worth, and realists within limits.
9780198744122 English 0198744129 Tim Button explores the relationship between words and world; between semantics and scepticism. A certain kind of philosopher--the external realist--worries that appearances might be radically deceptive; we might all, for example, be brains in vats, stimulated by an infernal machine. But anyone who entertains the possibility of radical deception must also entertain a further worry: that all of our thoughts are totally contentless. That worry is just incoherent. We cannot, then, be external realists, who worry about the possibility of radical deception. Equally, though, we cannot be internal realists, who reject all possibility of deception. We must position ourselves somewhere between internal realism and external realism, but we cannot hope to say exactly where. We must be realists, for what that is worth, and realists within limits. In establishing these claims, Button critically explores and develops several themes from Hilary Putnam's work: the model-theoretic arguments; the connection between truth and justification; the brain-in-vat argument; semantic externalism; and conceptual relativity. The Limits of Realism establishes the continued significance of these topics for all philosophers interested in mind, logic, language, or the possibility of metaphysics., Tim Button presents a bold new account of the relationship between minds, words, and world. The contours of the realism debate can be traced by considering the legacy of scepticism. A certain kind of realist--an external realist--invokes the picture of a 'God's Eye point of view'. All truths are revealed to God. But the external realist is painfully aware that we are not gods. Indeed, she might worry that we might all just be brains in vats being fed electronic signals by some infernal machine, so that we are victims of some radical deception. Such worries are bad, to be sure, but they get worse. For Hilary Putnam has given us tools--the model-theoretic arguments--that convert the worry that appearances are radically deceptive into the worry that none of our thoughts is so much as capable of being true or false. That last worry is just incoherent. Button argues that we must smash the picture of a 'God's Eye point of view' and overcome the worry that appearances are radically deceptive. This is no easy task, but Putnam's anti-sceptical brain-in-vat argument points to a general and resilient way to overcome the fear of radical deception. Unfortunately, the argument has its limits. We cannot be internal realists, who reject any possibility of deception, for our ability to insulate ourselves against radical deception is as vague as the word "radical" itself. We must position ourselves somewhere between internal realism and external realism, and we cannot hope to say exactly where. We are forced to philosophise in the absence of any comforting picture. We are realists, for what that is worth, and realists within limits.